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Bosnian Political Context and Research Question
1 Bearing in mind the fact that Bosnia and Herzegovina (hereinafter,  Bosnia or BiH) is
seriously  lagging  behind  other  countries  from  Western  Balkans  on  the  way  to  EU
membership, it seems that Bosnia is a “special case” or a sui generis country for the EU
officials. For instance, a statement delivered by Milorad Dodik, the populist leader of the
most popular Bosnian Serb party - the Union of Independent Social Democrats (SNSD),
provides indicative signal of unclear, vague, and complex relations between BiH and the
European Union. In fact, Dodik, with regard to appointment of Peter Sørensen as a new
Head of EU Delegation to Bosnia and Herzegovina, said that he has set measures and
conditions in order to create good cooperation with the European Union. In other words,
Dodik asserted that Sørensen will have a partner in Republika Srpska only if the solutions
for Bosnian problems are not imposed from international community1. Thus, even before
the international  official  started his  mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina,  the Bosnian
political elites have prepared some measures to be respected, and kept a look on his
interaction  and  work  with  local  political  representatives.  However,  this  is  quite  an
unacceptable and paradoxical situation since the EU is in position to set the standards
and measures to be implemented rather than politicians from the potential candidate and
candidate countries.  What  we have in Bosnia is  the fact  that  Dodik — and on other
occasions, a number of local politicians from all the three ethnic communities equally,
namely  Bosnian  Muslims,  Bosnian  Croats,  and  Bosnian  Serbs  —  is  interpreting  the
European standards and criteria according to their so-called “Bosnian standards” built in
particularistic  ideological  interests.  As  a  result,  the  political  positions  and views  the
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Bosnian politicians hold clearly demonstrate the seriousness and depth of the credibility
crisis that the European Union states are facing in Bosnia and Herzegovina. 
2 Although it was thought that the process of European integration, which started in the
aftermath of the war in 1995, would bring political stability, economic prosperity and
social harmony to Bosnia and Herzegovina, it has not happened so far. In other words,
most of the strategies which the EU has used in Bosnia has ended in failure, except for a
new  state  agencies,  police  reform,  and  visa  liberalisation.  Thus,  according  to  the
European Commission’s Progress Report for 2011 which evaluates the country’s progress
regarding the EU-related reforms, Bosnia and Herzegovina has been lagging behind other
countries from the western Balkans — comprising today Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina,
Croatia,  the  Former  Yugoslav  Republic  of  Macedonia,  Montenegro,  Serbia,  as  well  as
Kosovo (See Table 1.1).
Country Feasibility
Study
Stabilisation  and
Association
Agreement (SAA)
Accession
Application
Actual
Status
Start  of
Negotiation
  Signature Entry  in
Force
   
Albania 2002 12/06/06 01/04/09 28/04/09 Potential
Candidate
 
Bosnia  and
Herzegovina
2003 16/06/08   Potential
Candidate
 
Croatia 2000 29/10/01 01/02/05 21/02/03 Candidate
Country
03/10/05
Macedonia 1999 09/04/01 01/04/04 22/03/04 Candidate
Country
01/10/09
Montenegro 2005 15/10/07 01/05/10 21/12/08 Candidate
Country
01/10/11
Serbia 2005 29/04/08 14/06/10 22/12/09 Potential
Candidate
 
 
Table 1.1 Steps of the EU Stabilization and Association Process.
Source : The Author’s Contribution
3 While  other  countries  from  the  region  have  made  some  progress  towards  the  EU
membership,  Bosnian  political  elites  have  spent  this  time  quarrelling  and  further
increasing ethnic tensions in the country. What is more, most of Bosnian politicians have
not  paid  expected  attention  to  the  European  integration  agenda  as  they  massively
focused on achievement of their short-term ethnic-nationalist interests. Without doubt,
for  the  ruling  nationalist  elites,  EU  integration  project  imposes  high  adoption  costs
because it undermines their power base, entirely built on domination of ethnic identity.
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Although domestic political elites are surely to a significant extent responsible for the
country’s insufficient reform processes it is also of crucial importance to understand the
role and responsibility  of  the EU concerning the country’s  stagnant Europeanisation.
Thus, central question in this paper is : to what extent is the EU responsible for the stagnant
process of European integration-related reforms in Bosnia and Herzegovina ?
 
European Integration vs. Ethnic-Nationalism
4 In practice, the agenda related to European integration process is not important in the
political discourse among most of Bosnian political leaders.  The promise and hope of
European Union membership has not been a « sufficient instrument » for the Bosnian
politicians to make them respect the European values, norms and rules, and make them
work on their implementation into domestic policies. Although ruling political elites are
from time to time making statements that their objective is the accession into the EU,
most of them are doing very little to make the country closer to Brussels. Furthermore,
most of the ruling Bosnian politicians are still living in the past while the EU-related
agenda  should  encourage  them  to  look  towards  common  and  more  prosperous  and
peaceful future. Such political context explicitly demonstrate deepness and seriousness of
the crisis which Bosnian political sphere is confronted with since the very end of the war
in 1995. Rather than focusing on issues related with the European integration and the
well-being of the ordinary citizens, politicians in Bosnia emphasize emotion-appealing
politics,  consequently  increasing  inter-ethnic  polarization  and  disputes,  what  clearly
indicates the post-war arrogance and irresponsible political rhetoric of ethno-nationalist
political representatives. As Kurt Bassuener points out, « the Dayton constitution makes
leveraging fear politically profitable and politicians unaccountable. Bosnian politicians
pursue their self-aggrandizing, maximalist goals at the expense of the general welfare »2.
As a result, under the monopolistic regime of nationalist political elites Bosnia has been
suffering more than a decade long political status quo. 
5 In other words, ethno-nationalist political parties have been dominating political sphere
in Bosnia and Herzegovina from the first democratic elections held in early 1990s. Such a
preference for strictly ethnic parties by BiH electorate has been repeated at each election
with  the  only  exception  of  those  of  2000,  when  Social  Democratic  Party
(Socijaldemokratska partija, SDP), one of rare examples of multi-national political parties
in  Bosnia,  won the  elections.  Thus,  what  has  happened to  Bosnia  is  not  democratic
transition  but  rather  “ethnocratic  transition”.  As  Asim Mujkić  points  out :  « I  call  a
community  characterized  by  the  political  priority  of  the  ethnic  group(s)  over  the
individual  that  is  implemented through democratic  self-legislation,  and a community
characterized by the political priority of the ethnic group’s right to self-determination
over  the  citizen’s  right  to  self-determination  where  the  citizen’s  membership  in  a
political  community  is  determined  by  her  or  his  membership  in  ethnic  community,
Ethnopolis.  And  I  call  the  political  narrative  and  practice  intended  to  justify  this
ethnically-based social construct, ethnopolitics »3. Political competition for votes has been
based  mainly  on  nationalist  rhetoric, and  so-called  politics  of  outbidding  has
continuously taken place in the post-war BiH as nationalist parties have cemented their
early seize of power in successive elections4. As a result, ethnic politicians could not reach
compromises on very crucial issues, even if it was necessary for the whole country to
continue its road toward the EU membership. As the EC concluded : « In BiH, nationalist
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rhetoric  by  key  political  leaders  is  challenging  the  arrangements  established  by  the
Dayton/Paris  peace agreement and has stalled reforms.  Much needed reforms of  the
police and of the constitutional framework have failed to make progress »5. Yet, has the
EU-related process not helped the country to become more democratic and stable ? 
 
Bosnia and the European Union 
6 BiH and the European Union have been in deep economic and political relations more
than a decade. That is, in the aftermath of the war in Bosnia which ended in December
1995 the European Union has intensified its strategic activities and programs towards the
Western Balkans (hereinafter WB or Balkans) region in whole, including Bosnia. Also, the
end of the war was the shift in the EU approach towards the Western Balkans in general
and BiH in particular. That is, the EU proposed one after another the initiatives that were
supposed to strengthen and speed up the European perspective of BiH6. The first such
initiative  came  from  France  during  its  EU  presidency  in  December  1996  within  the
framework of the so-called Royaumont Process. The initiative’s central objective was the
stabilization,  democratisation,  and  peace-building  in  South-East  Europe.  Thus,  the
Royaumont  Process  was  the  first  regional  strategy  towards  the  Western  Balkans.
Furthermore, the EU developed a regional approach launching a political and economic
conditionality  for  the  development  of  bilateral  relations.  Better  to  say,  through  the
PHARE and OBNOVA humanitarian programmes, which started in 1997, for the first time
in  the  region the  EU initiated  political  and  economic  conditionality  as  its  economic
assistance under the mentioned initiatives was provided on condition that  recipients
respect human rights, democracy, and the rule of law7. This was a clear sign that the EU
has  changed its  approach towards  Western Balkans  region and towards  Bosnia  from
passive and incoherent to more active, committed, and united one. EU clearly showed his
interest in resolving political, economic, and social problems that the whole region face. 
7 Additionaly, in June 1998 the EU-BiH Consultative Task Force was established. Its major
area of responsibility was to provide technical and expert advice in the field of judiciary,
education, media, administration, and economy. In Susko’s words, this event marked BiH
official approximation towards the EU membership8. Furthermore, the same year in June
the EU and BiH officials signed the “Declaration of Special Relations between EU and BiH”.
Then in 1999 the EU has initiated Stabilisation and Association Process (SAP) establishing
more concrete and tangible political and economic links with the regional countries. Also,
SAP was characterised by a twofold approach focusing on country-specific conditions on
the one hand, and a regional approach towards the Western Balkans on the other9. In
addition, the SAP became the centerpiece of the EU’s long-term strategy towards the
region  of  Western  Balkans.  The  main  objective  of  the  SAP  was  to  push  democratic
consolidation of  the countries  from the region through substantial  domestic  reforms
which are based on European values and structures. Put differently, the SAP has been
built on the idea of first stabilization of the region and its latter integration into the EU
political and economic structures. The European Commission has put six key target areas
into the SAP10 :
1. Development of existing economic and trade relations with and within the region ;
2. Development and partial redirection of existing economic and financial assistance ;
3. Increased assistance for democratization, civil society, education, and institution-building ;
4. Cooperation in the area of justice and home affairs ;
Europeanisation Process of Bosnia and Herzegovina : Responsibility of the Eur...
Balkanologie, Vol. XIII, n° 1-2 | 2011
4
5. Development of political dialogue, including regional level ;
6. Negotiation of Stabilization and Association Agreements.
8 Thus, the regional shift in terms of integration emerged with the EU’s clear commitment
towards EU membership of the Western Balkans in 199911. In addition, in June 2000 in the
Feira  European  Council,  the  EU  member  states  decided  that  all  the  SAP  countries,
including Bosnia and Herzegovina, are potential candidates for future EU membership.
Also, on 8 March 2000 the EU Enlargement Commissioner Chris Patten announced the
Road Map for BiH as the first step in the framework of SAP. The document identified 18
initial steps which had to be implemented and which could lead to a feasibility study for a
SAA with the EU. A new European partnership with Bosnia and Herzegovina was adopted
by the Council  on 18 February 2008.  Because of  a  difficult  and slow reform process,
Bosnian government signed a Stabilisation and Association Agreement (SAA) with the EU
in June 2008, which was the first pre-accession tool towards the country’s EU membership
12.  The previous EU enlargement commissioner Olli  Rehn called it  « a  milestone that
marks a new stage in our relations » and « a gateway for [EU] candidacy »13. Nevertheless,
since that time little progress has been achieved due to inflammatory ethno-nationalist
rhetoric. Also, slow and stagnant reforms in Bosnia are to some extent the result of a
weak, passive, and uncommitted role of the international community, and especially the
EU as central actor in Bosnia in past decade.
 
Europeanization as a Theoretical Perspective
9 Given the fact that Bosnia and Herzegovina has been more than a decade passing through
deep and thorough European Union-related reform process, in the literature on European
integration — so-called Europeanization process — the European Union is expected to
develop more clear-cut and coherent strategy toward this EU aspirant country. Domm
stresses  that  « the  recommendation here  is  for  the  EU,  aided by  the  EEAS,  to  move
towards a more coherent, credible policy towards Bosnia »14. Actually, Europeanization
process is not only about adopting and implementing EU policies, rules, norms and values
into the domestic economic, legal and political context. It is equally important that the
EU sets clear standards, measures and rules which are to be adopted by aspirants on the
membership.  As Anastasakis  and Bechev conclude,  « the criteria and benefits  of  (EU)
conditionality must be visible not just to the elites but also to the citizens, in order to
sustain momentum for reform along the long and difficult road to accession »15. Better to
say, Europeanization process as a comprehensive reform and transformation oriented
process is a two-way street between the European Union and the countries that aspire for
the  EU membership.  That  is  why,  it  is  of  paramount  importance  that  the  roles  and
responsibilities both of the European Union and the EU aspirants, in this case Bosnia, be
clearly defined and not left to political manipulation. 
10 The idea of  Europeanization has  become very popular  within the study of  European
integration. Since early 1990s the concept has been widely used by EU scholars in terms of
analysing the EU’s impact on its member states and generally in shaping global affairs.
There have been a variety of definitions made in relation to Europeanization. However,
most of them interpret this process as reform process in domestic political and economic
system  affected  by  policies  decided  at  the  European  level.  That  is,  we  can  define
Europeanization  as  a  kind  of  form  of  domestic  change  that  is  caused  by  European
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decision-making.  Similarly,  Radaelli  defines  Europeanization  as  « processes  of  (a)
construction,  (b)  diffusion  and  (c)  institutionalization  of  formal  and  informal  rules,
procedures, policy paradigms, styles, ways of doing things and shared beliefs and norms
which  are  first  defined  and  consolidated  in  the  making  of  EU  decisions  and  then
incorporated in the logic of domestic discourses, identities, political structures and public
policies »16. However, very often it happens that European norms and values clash with
EU aspirant’s  laws,  values,  and norms.  As  Rory Domm argues  « despite  the  rhetoric,
Europeanization, whereby vast numbers of detailed, non-negotiable rules are adopted by
applicant countries, is hardly always consistent with local ownership »17. As Pridham has
shown on the example of Slovakia, although the demands from the EU may have a strong
and positive impact on the democratisation in an applicant country, success still very
much  depends  on  a  number  of  factors,  including  the  determination  of  individual
governments,  strong  public  support  for  accession,  and  mutually  supportive  political
dynamics in Brussels and the future member states18. Thus, it is of crucial importance
that the EU find the way and develop solid methods how to diffuse and transmit its rules,
policies, values and a European paradigm as an overall concept. The EU leaders are more
than aware that there can be political groupings in any EU aspirant that do not want to
accept each and every rule and standard coming from Brussels. 
11 In addition, Europeanization is a logical extension of the EU integration theory. It gained
special  popularity  among  academic  circles  during  the  1990s  and  beyond19.
Europeanization process may have two functions. First, it explains the influence of the
European  politics  and  institutions  on  the  domestic  politics.  Second,  Europeanization
stresses  the  process  of  change  through  which  domestic  actors  adapt  to  European
integration.  Such  a  Europeanization  effect  is  best  illustrated  through  the  “basic
paradigm”, although very general one (Figure 1.1).
 
Figure 1.1 Europeanization and Domestic Change
Source : Risse (Thomas), Cowles (Maria G.), Caporaso (James), « Europeanization and Domestic
Change : Introduction », in Cowles (Maria G.) et al., Transforming Europe. Europeanization and Domestic
Change, Cornell University Press, 2011, p. 6) 
12 The paradigm emphasizes that European integration leads to pressures in order to make
necessary adjustments which are then influenced by domestic factors, and finally lead to
outcomes20.  Indeed, europeanization has critical transformative power in the member
states. Here, degree of pressure created by the europeanization is of a crucial importance.
This pressure is a function of the degree of fit  (misfit)  or congruence (incongruence)
between “Europe” and the domestic level21. As a result, degree of fit or misfit leads to
adaptational pressures. Simply put, if  the EU policies and its standards are similar to
those  at  the  domestic  level  then pressure  for  reform is  much lower.  However,  such
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pressure is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for reforms to be made by domestic
actors22. For successful EU reform process to happen, the combination of a strong and
united EU and a committed domestic factors is crucial.
 
EU’s Capability-Expectations Gap
13 The literature of the European studies has been full of praise, potential and arguments
perceiving the EU as a normative, civilian, humanitarian, and even military actor at the
international  stage.  However,  the  most  important  thing  here  is  to  understand  and
evaluate practical relevance and concrete results of such academic statements. In other
words, it is of utmost importance to measure and explain whether there is relevance
between the  idea  of  “European actorness”  and tangible  results  achieved in  practical
delivery.  In 1993 Christopher Hill  analysed the European Union from the angle of its
international  role  and  came  to  conclusion  that  there  is  the  so-called  “capability-
expectations gap” — between what the EU has been talking to be doing and what it is
actually able to deliver in practice. Hill points out that the capability-expectations gap
has resulted from three closely related factors :  namely, the ability to agree, resource
availability,  and  the  instruments  at  the  EU’s  disposal23.  As  Toje  claims,  « without
capabilities and frameworks in place, the lack of agreement on foreign policy goals and
the means by which they are to be attained could remain clouded in ambiguity »24. That
is, for the EU to promote itself as a capable and powerful actor in global politics it is
important  that  it  shifts  from mere  rhetoric  about  its  “actorness”  to  resolving  acute
problems  in  world  and  in  its  neighbourhood.  As  Hill  claimed,  if  the  capability-
expectations gap is to be closed, the notion of European international activities must be
grounded in demonstrated behaviour rather than potential and aspirations25. 
14 In this light, it is important to understand the role and potential of the EU to press for
reform process in Bosnia in order to make this country a success story instead of the “sick
man of Europe”. To put it differently, without confronting Bosnian malaise seriously and
constantly accusing the domestic ethno-nationalist political elites inflammatory rhetoric
as  a  primary  reason  for  years-long  deadlock  the  EU  is  pursuing  risky  policy  which
describes it as a weak and not-serious-enough to challenge sensitive global problems.
15 In fact, eighty-eight percent of Bosnians support Bosnia’s European ambitions, according
to the poll conducted by the Bosnian agency for European integration for which 1 200
people  were  questioned26.  Furthermore,  the  poll  results  show  that  support  for  EU
membership is strongest in Bosnia’s Muslim (Bošniak) community with 97 percent in
favor, while 85 percent of Bosnian Croats support it and 78 percent of Bosnian Serbs27.
Such a significant number of supporters of EU integration among the citizens of all the
three  ethnic  groups  is  an  opportunity  for  the  EU to  prove  its  practical  capabilities.
However,  there is a question mark whether the EU can meet the expectations of the
Bosnian citizens.  Does it  have necessary tools  and resources to help resolve Bosnian
enigma ? Therefore, as Hill stresses it is very important for all sides involved to measure
the  effectiveness  of  current  europeanization  process  in  Bosnia  and  sketch  « a  more
realistic picture of what the Community (EU) …. does in the world »28.
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The EU Conditionality in Bosnia and Herzegovina
16 The EU conditionality is an important way to boost internal reforms in the countries
which  have  established  bilateral  links  with  Brussels.  Thus,  europeanization  reform
process in aspirant countries such as Bosnia itself is to a large extent driven by the so-
called  EU  conditionality  that  stimulates  domestic  reforms.  In  addition,  the  EU
conditionality can therefore be understood as an “ad hoc acquis démocratique” which has
been significantly shaped in the framework of the Copenhagen Criteria29. Specifically, the
EU conditionality is based on “strict conditions” that the candidate or potential candidate
countries have to meet in order to become full members of the EU30. As Schimmelfennig
and  Sedelmeier  argue,  « the  dominant  logic  underpinning  EU  conditionality  is  a
bargaining strategy of reinforcement by reward, under which the EU provides external
incentives for a target government to comply with its conditions »31. So far, the EU has
established several  strategic  tools  through which it  attempts  to  press  the process  of
institutional adjustment to EU standards and values. Overall, the EU conditionality in the
Western Balkans, including Bosnia, is established by the following tools32 :
1. the general Copenhagen criteria – political,  economic and acquis-related – applied to all
candidate and potential candidate countries ;
2. the 1997 Regional Approach and the 1999 SAP ;
3. country-specific  conditions  to  be  met  before  entering  the  SAA  negotiation  phase  and
conditions arising out of the SAAs and the CARDS framework ;
4. conditions related to individual projects and the granting of aid, grants or loans ;
5. conditions that arise out of peace agreements and political deals (e.g. Resolution 1244 of the
UN Security Council, and the Dayton, Ohrid, and Belgrade agreements). 
17 EU conditionality is aimed at integrating the Balkan states into the EU : its intention is to
promote  reform,  to  prescribe  criteria  attached  to  EU-granted  benefits,  and  to
differentiate among countries by assessing each on its own merit33. Although it is often
taken for  granted that  EU member  states  possess  wide-ranging conditionality  power
which can “naturally” press domestic officials to implement required EU-related agenda,
it often results in opposite direction, as EU aspirants demonstrate significant level of
resistance. That is,  while many expected that europeanizing reform process will  have
critical impact on the crisis-driven western Balkans region and especially Bosnia as its
very unstable part, the entire process resulted in fixed positions of ethno-nationalists
that are ready for Brussels  only at  a  declaratory level.  In addition,  the idea that  EU
conditionality will work in Bosnia and solve its post-war political, economic and legal
problems seems to result  in complete disappointment as  seen so far.  In that  regard,
Sebastian points out that the EU jeopardized and failed to link the power and incentives
inherent in its accession conditionality to the constitutional reform process in Bosnia34.
As  Noutcheva notes :  in  essence,  the reforms demanded by the EU as  conditions  for
establishing contractual relations with BiH link its membership prospects to changes in
the internal state structure of BiH35. However, internal political agenda in Bosnia has not
shifted to such an important extent towards the so-called “European agenda”. It is also
puzzling that although the EU has intensified its activities in Bosnia there have not been
significant positive reforms regarding the EU reforms in the country. 
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18 Today, more than other bigger world players from international community such as USA,
Russia,  and China, EU is heavily involved in the political and economic affairs in the
western Balkans and in Bosnia and Herzegovina in particular. During the Yugoslav wars
in the early 1990s the EU had played very weak and incoherent role due to a serious lack
of commitment and political will of its member states to pool more sovereignty in order
to build stronger and more coherent security and defence policy at the European level. As
Javier Solana points out, « when the Yugoslav wars broke out in the 1990s we watched as
our neighbourhood burned because we had no means of responding to the crisis »36. At
the beginning of the Yugoslav crisis, the Luxembourg Foreign Minister Jacques Poos, then
head of the EC Presidency, declared that the organization would intervene in Yugoslavia
because it was « the hour of Europe, not the hour of the United States » ; however, the
opposite proved true since it was a diplomatic fiasco for Europe and a diplomatic and
military domination of the USA. Famous Henry Kissinger’s question, « what is Europe’s
phone number ? », proved its relevance. What’s more, only US leadership and initiative
created the Dayton peace agreement in November 1995, ending a brutal three and a half
year bloody war in Bosnia37. 
19 However, after the war the EU developed more strategic and tangible approach towards
the Western Balkans countries.  There has been an understanding that instability and
possible conflicts in the region pose direct and serious threat to the EU. As a response, the
EU developed more pro-active and comprehensive security and defence policy at  the
European level. As pointed out by Chris Patten, the European Commissioner for External
Relations, « the dreadful humiliation Europe suffered in the Balkans in the early nineties
also made us realise that Europe had to finally get its  act  together »38.  Among other
things, in December 2004, the EU launched a peacekeeping military operation in BiH,
replacing NATO’s SFOR mission. In addition, the EU sent its Police Mission to Bosnia in
January 2003 to replace the UN’s International Police Task Force (IPTF) as part of the
broader rule of law strategy in BiH and in the region. On the other hand, the US changed
its  diplomatic  and  military  priorities  and  deployed  most  of  its  troops  in  Iraq  and
Afghanistan. Following initiation and later signing of SAA the western Balkan countries
shifted from the US-dominated Dayton era into the EU-dominated Brussels era. As Javier
Solana, the former High Representative of the EU pointed out,  the most fundamental
objective of the EU at this transition stage is to move from « the era of Dayton » to « the
era of Brussels »39. However, the so-called Brussels era has not passed without challenges.
20 Following the US shift in its foreign policy of prioritizing other regions more than Bosnia,
such development has left significant diplomatic space for other global powers such as
the EU to assert its influence in this highly problematic country. As a result, Hadžikadunić
believes  that  gradual  withdrawal  of  the  US from the western Balkans  towards  more
critical world regions has signalized leaving the Balkans region to the EU as its natural
and  strong  ally40.  Thus,  by  formulating  specific  democracy-relevant  conditions  and
identifying areas where democratic reforms were required, the EU initiatives became the
main driving force behind democratisation in the Western Balkans and Bosnia as well.
The EU thereby became the main actor of external democracy promotion in the region,
with  overlapping  processes  of  europeanisation  and  democratisation41.  Although  the
Union developed new institutional relations with the regional countries through newly
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initiated SAA, it has faced a lot of challenges, especially in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The
SAA includes provisions and measures for future EU membership of the western Balkan
countries. In fact, SAA is similar to the Europe Agreements that the EU signed with the
Central and Eastern European countries in the 1990s and to the Association Agreement
with Turkey. However, because of a long-lasting political malaise in Bosnia, it is obvious
that the “EU’s carrot” in the form of SAA has not worked with the local country’s officials.
In fact, Bassuener and Lyon in this light claim that not only did the SAA not generate
momentum, but Republika Srpska (RS) is busy unravelling some of the hard-won gains of
the previous 13 years, including reforms required by the EU as preconditions for signing
the SAA42. That is why the leaders’ duty is to make the bloc’s values, norms, and standards
more attractive and more concrete both for Bosnian politicians and its citizens. 
21 Furthermore, the “EU sticks” have not been effective in interactions with the Bosnian
political elites. Better to say, the EU has not developed adequate “stick policy” which
could be applied to politicians, political parties, and organizations that support policies
that  are  opposed  to  Euro-Atlantic  integration  principles  and that  question  the  state
institutions. Thus, the EU foreign minister Lady Ashton has only recently demanded that
her  new Bosnian envoy,  part  of  her  newly created diplomatic  service,  be  given new
powers by the Council of EU foreign ministers to impose travel bans and asset freezes on
obstructionist Bosnian politicians43. Even the EU financial aid directed at the country has
not been enough motor force that would motivate domestic politicians to implement
necessary  measures  that  Brussels  had set  beforehand.  For  instance,  the  EU provides
targeted  assistance  to  candidates and  potential  candidate s countries  through  IPA
(Instrument for pre-accession assistance) which supersedes the five previously existing
pre-accession instruments, PHARE, ISPA, SAPARD, Turkey instrument, and CARDS. Thus,
the  European  Commission  has  allocated 440  million  Euro  of  support  to  BiH  in  its
transition from a  potential  candidate  country  to  a  candidate  country  for  the  period
2007-2011 under the IPA. BiH as a potential candidate is currently eligible for assistance
to transition and institution building and cross-border cooperation. However, the EU has
in some instances cut its financial assistance to BiH due to slow reform process. Thus, the
EU  has  clearly  demonstrated  that  very  often  it  has  been  insensitive  regarding  the
complexities and troubles of social and political context of Bosnia and Herzegovina. 
 
The EU’s Central Bodies in Bosnia and Herzegovina
22 The European Union has so far established bodies and instruments through which it
attempts  to  speed up Bosnia  on the road to  full  membership.  One such body is  the
European Union Special Representative in BiH (EUSR) which is currently acting as a High
Representative as well. In March 2001 Lord Paddy Ashdown was named as the first EUSR
in  BiH.  The  main  and  the  most  important  duty  of  EUSR  has  been  to  help  the  BiH
government in making EU reforms. As the Commission stresses, the mandate of the EUSR
is to promote overall political coordination and offer the EU advice and facilitation to BiH
to help the country meet necessary requirements for the EU membership44. The EUSR’s
Special mandate is derived from the European Union’s policy objectives in Bosnia and
Herzegovina. These include, in particular, helping achieve progress in implementing the
Dayton Peace Agreement  as  well  as  in the Stabilisation and Association Process45.  In
addition, the EUSR regularly reports to the Council of the European Union, the inter-
governmental  body  representing  the  27  EU  member  states,  through  the  High
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Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy and Secretary-General of the
Council.  Thus,  the EUSR has been of crucial  importance to put pressure on domestic
political leaders to continue with the EU-related reform process. However, due to vague
position of the EU on the Bosnian crisis the EUSR has played unclear and ambiguous role. 
23 Very often there has been serious imposition of reform process from the HR/EUSR on
local  politicians,  and  recent  police  reform  has  brought  it  to  light.  The  Commission
Feasibility  Study  published  in  November  2003  identified  weaknesses  in  the  policing
system in BiH and concluded that it was necessary to « proceed with structural police
reforms with a view to rationalizing police services »46. As BiH political elites could not
make compromise on the necessary reforms, the EUSR imposed the reforms on them and
thus solved the deadlock. This finally enabled the EC to recommend the start of SAA
negotiations with the BiH government on 21 October 2005. However, such an imposition
was  clearly  a  forced  europeanizing  reform.  Previous  HR  Petritsch  summarized  the
situation  by  stressing :  « I  furthermore  wanted  to  move  this  country  away  from  a
situation where it seemed, that fundamental changes — at times even alien to its local
traditions — were being simply imposed on this state and its citizens. More often than not
— the country was treated as object”47. BiH future in the EU is thus highly uncertain and
even problematic because of the underdeveloped domestic policy-making structures and
serious marginalization of both political representatives and ordinary citizens from open
democratic deliberation. That is,  coerced Europeanization by the EUSR has prevented
genuine  democracy  from  flourishing.  Thus,  the  EU  is  implicitly  paralyzing  active
involvement in policy-making and political responsibility of the Bosnian politicians.
24 In addition, very often disunited position of the EU member states makes the role of the
EUSR in BiH ineffective and weak. For instance, the status of the double-hatted OHR/
EUSR was sometimes very unclear and disputed. Thus, commenting on the appointment
of Lord Ashdown as the EUSR, the EUPM official claimed that without dedicated EUSR
staff, it was felt that “he was the right person for the job…but he never really was the
EUSR”48.  Also,  another  EUPM  official put  it  that  “the  EUSR  position  was  essentially
irrelevant”49.  This was the case when in January 2009,  the international community’s
High Representative and the EUSR in Bosnia and Herzegovina unexpectedly announced
his resignation in order to take up the post of Slovak Foreign Minister instead. From his
early mandate he knew very well that his position was like ‘riding a dead horse’ as he
used to say. Therefore, as Judy Batt points out, “the abrupt departure of HR/EUSR Lajcak
has exposed drift and disarray in the EU’s policy towards BiH”50. It would not be far from
truth to say that Lajcak did not have clear-cut message of support from Brussels which
would help him to do his job effectively. As the International Crisis Group pointed out in
its  report,  “there  is  some reluctance  in  Brussels  for  taking up such  responsibilities,
especially  if  it  means  deployment  of  the  largest  ever  EUSR office,  and increased  EC
funding”51. 
 
European Union States Divided in Bosnia
25 Very often the EU leaders seem very divided and deliver oppressing messages when the
European  integration  reforms in  Bosnia  are  concerned.  In  view  of  the  former  US
Ambassador Charles English, “part of the problem is that the EU itself is divided about
Bosnia. Among member states, only a handful, most notably the UK, appear to have a
clear grasp of the dangers posed by Bosnia’s current political dynamics”52. Probably the
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best demonstration and proof to this fact has been diverse views and opinions of the EU
officials  regarding  the  future  design  and  content  of  the  Bosnian  constitutional
framework.  In fact,  the Bosnian authorities are expected to implement the European
democratic values and effective bureaucratic standards that are based on the Copenhagen
and Madrid criteria, respectively. However, although the Copenhagen and Madrid criteria
propose  what  are  the  standards  and  measures  that  have  to  be  implemented  by  the
Bosnian  politicians,  the  EU  member  states  have  not  demonstrated  a  common  and
principled position on the necessary constitutional changes. Thus, while EU officials have
been vocal in their demands and calls for constitutional change, they have not been clear
enough and committed about the specific requirements expected53. As a result, the EU
member states are as divided as the local politicians are over the design and shape of the
future Bosnian constitution. This has resulted in a huge EU credibility crisis in Bosnia. In
this respect, Cohen argues that if the EU does not clearly support the progress that has
already been made in the europeanization of the Western Balkan countries the European
Union would surely pay a very high price54.
26 Over time there have even been different messages from the EU politicians and officials
regarding the content and degree of reform within the country’s constitution. To clarify,
the European Commission President Barroso pointed out that while constitutional reform
was not a strict  condition for signing the SAA,  « there is  [a]  link between these two
processes … The EC and EU have to be convinced that they have a partner in BiH, which
will be capable to respect its promises and implement the Agreement that we negotiate
now »55. Thus, this has been a sort of informal requirement that the EU officials expect
from the Bosnian political representatives to implement reforms in order to speed up the
whole European integration process. However, there have been a number of European
leaders who do not support the idea that Bosnia needs a new or modified constitution in
order to enter the EU family. For instance, Solana asserted in his speech « I do not think it
would be a good idea to open Dayton again at this moment. Of course, if  there is an
agreement between the three sides on some arrangements or solutions, I would not be
against it . . . [but] I very much hope that as time goes by you will have the discipline and
the  energy  to  do  this  alone,  without  the  need  for  pressure  and  impulse  from  the
international community »56. In addition, Werner Almhofer, Austrian Ambassador to BiH,
claims  that  the  European  Union  had  never  set  the  successful  implementation  of
constitutional reforms as a condition for BiH’s EU membership57.  Better tosay, the EU
authorities  have  perceived  the  constitutional  reform  as  an  informal  conditionality
without clearly stating rewards or punishments for BiH politicians. 
27 Although the EU leaders have often stressed that BiH cannot realize its EU aspirations if it
does  not  reform its  constitutional  framework,  most  of  them have  not  demonstrated
necessary commitment and political  will  to help Bosnia resolve its political deadlock.
That happened to a large degree due to diverse national interests of the EU member
states on foreign policy questions and due to vagueness of the Copenhagen and Madrid
criteria that are open to political manipulation. As Govedarica points out : « It is true that
the EU has had no clear stance towards Bosnia. For a long time the EU officials have
believed that the mere process of European integration will solve the country’s problems.
However, when it was clear that it was not the case then the EU could not find adequate
alternative  instrument »58.  Better  to  say,  since  the  EU  has  not  stressed  clearly  the
measures required, the Copenhagen and Madrid criteria can be understood in thousands
of different ways as is the case with the Bosnian elites. As a result, Bosnian Muslims want
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to enter Brussels as a country with strong and powerful central state. Bosnian Croats are
in support of highly decentralized country. Bosnian Serb leaders see Bosnia in the EU as a
weak central state with strong entities. That is why, the EU should treat Bosnian case
differently from other EU aspirant countries.  Put differently,  Bosnia and Herzegovina
with its long history of international protectorate, inter-ethnic conflicts, shifting borders
and a recent brutal war, is not as other countries59.
 
Failure of the Initiative for Dayton II 
28 Dayton Agreement  established the  Constitution of  BiH in  an annex,  deciding on the
division of the country into two Entities : the Bosniak/Croat Federation of BiH (mainly
controlled  by  the  Bosniaks  and  Bosnian  Croats),  and  the  Republika  Srpska  (mainly
governed by the Bosnian Serbs). Both of the country’s entities have their own political
and governance structures. The Federation of BiH is divided into three levels : the entity
level, the cantonal level, and the municipal level. The RS does not have a cantonal level, it
only has municipalities. Overall, the DPA has succeeded in keeping BiH as an independent
and sovereign country with a joint multi ethnic government. Thus, the current political
system in Bosnia is a product and result of the Dayton Agreement. Also, one of the most
important goals of the DPA, restoration of security and physical infrastructure, has been
satisfactorily  met.  However,  the  broader  objective  of  organizing  a  multi-ethnic,
democratic, and economically self-sustaining country is still a long way away60. While the
DPA brought the war to an end and laid the foundation for consolidating peace, many
observers also believe that the agreement as a document reflects wartime circumstances
and cannot by itself ensure BiH’s future as a functioning and self-sufficient democratic
state61. Also, even though the EU has repeatedly stated that constitutional reforms are
neither a formal requirement for closing the OHR nor for Bosnia’s entry into the EU, the
constitutional  framework  must  provide  stable  and  effective  state  structures  able  to
deliver EU integration reforms62.
29 Since domestic politicians could not agree on necessary changes within the constitution,
it has become more than obvious that external mediation, without a direct imposition of
a model, is deadly required if any significant progress is expected. And this happened
when the EU authorities decided to take decisive and concrete diplomatic lead in fixing
Dayton  and  thus  paving  the  way  for  a  new  era  of  functional,  self-sustaining  and
democratic BiH. Thus, during the Swedish EU Presidency there has been such initiative on
the constitutional reform on 10 October and again on 20-21 October, when Carl Bildt,
Sweden’s foreign minister, Olli Rehn, the European commissioner for enlargement, and
Jim Steinberg, the US Deputy Secretary of State, called most of Bosnia’s political party
leaders together at Butmir, outside Sarajevo, where they outlined a “package” of reforms
necessary, as they sold it, for deeper Euro-Atlantic integration of their country63. In the
medias,  the  meeting  in  Butmir  was  called  “Dayton  II”  which  best  demonstrates  its
importance for  the  BiH  future  governance.  However,  it  ended  in  complete  failure.
Bosnian Serb representatives rejected the proposed reforms as too drastic while Bosniak
and Croat  leaders  described them as  insufficient  to  solve  the  long-standing  political
stalemate. In this context, Bassuener and Lyon claim that « most of all, the EU needs to
articulate clearly to both politicians and citizens what level of functionality BiH needs to
have attained before becoming a viable candidate for membership in the EU, … The EU
must put forth a set of guidelines on what sort of BiH it can accept into its ranks, with
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clarity on what elements are unacceptable »64. What is more, ambiguous and ill-prepared
EU-US initiative at the Butmir NATO base just contributed to deepening of current crisis
rather than resolving it65.
30 Even though the EU and US seemed united and decisive in the Butmir process the whole
negotiations ended in huge failure as domestic leaders could not be persuaded by the
suggested  measures.  However,  as  Bosnia  is  for  a  long  time  passing  from Dayton  to
Brussels era the EU is the most responsible actor for Butmir’s constitution failure. As
Joseph points out, « Washington’s central policy challenge has shifted from getting the
Bosnians to cooperate to goading the Europeans to act. Although Brussels has far more at
stake than Washington does, and although it finally has a collective foreign minister, it
still acts only when galvanized by the Americans or by crisis, or both »66. The EU does not
know how to behave like a global player when it comes to the Bosnian case. What’s more,
civil  society was completely excluded from the Butmir negotiations.  This was a clear
threat to democratic deliberation that EU diplomats claim to be an important European
value.  Furthermore,  the  Butmir  meeting  has  not  even  mentioned  the  controversial
principle of entity voting, a voting principle in the constitution of BiH, which is supposed
to protect the interests of all  three ethnic groups in the country.  The power-sharing
mechanisms based solely on the principle of ethnic identity and the permanent blocking
of state institutions on the basis of the “national interests” of Serbs, Bosniaks and Croats
by using the entity veto (entitetsko glasanje) within the Parliamentary Assembly of BiH,
turned out to be major obstacles for decision making in the country and for reforms
needed in the context of EU integration67. Also, the EC clearly stressed that the “entity
voting” has often prevented swift adoption of legislation which hinders country’s rapid
progress towards the EU membership68. Butmir negotiations clearly showed once again
that Bosnia is a “difficult case” and that the international community, including the EU,
will need to employ more energy and commitment in resolving “the Bosnian paralysis”. 
 
Conclusions 
31 It is a natural part of the europeanisation process that the European Union goads Bosnian
government  to  implement  necessary  economic,  political,  legal  and  administrative
reforms as a part of the country’s EU-related reforms through which it has been going
through since late 1990s. However, Bosnia is for a long time in a serious political impasse
due to different interests of the three ethnic communities regarding the future structure
of the country’s constitutional framework and the country in general. Additionally, the
EU is equally responsible for the current status quo since its member states are not united
in terms of proposed standards and measures expected from Bosnian government.
32 European  leaders  believe  that  mere  process  of  europeanisation  of  Bosnia  will  bring
stability, prosperity and genuine peace to the country. They expect the Bosnian political
elites  to  make required changes  including the  question of  a  constitution that  might
satisfy all three ethnic communities. Yet, this is too a simplistic and unidimensional view
with  regard  to  complicated  Bosnian  political  and  social  context.  Although  the
Copenhagen and Madrid criteria propose what are the standards, values and norms that
have to be implemented in the EU aspirants, the EU states have not sent clear messages
regarding their expectations from the Bosnian political elites.As a result, BiH political
elites effectively manipulate with reluctance opinions coming from the EU states. This is a
serious credibility gap for the EU since it could not assert and prove itself as a strong and
Europeanisation Process of Bosnia and Herzegovina : Responsibility of the Eur...
Balkanologie, Vol. XIII, n° 1-2 | 2011
14
influential actor that is capable of solving “the Bosnian paralysis”. Thus, leaving Bosnians
to explore the options that befall a failed state – located within Europe but on the margins
of its prosperity and unity – is to simply acknowledge a bankruptcy policy69.
33 Despite the fact that the EU has utilized a number of strategic tools, instruments and
institutions in the post-war Bosnia and Herzegovina in order to help the country’s EU
reform  process,  such  an  approach  proved  rather  weak, ambiguous,  and  even
unsuccessful. For instance, very often disunited position of the EU member states makes
the role of the EUSR in BiH ineffective and highly invisible and weak — as it appeared
with former EUSR Miroslav Lajcak. Furthermore, as a fundamental agreement, the SAA,
has not generated expected reform processes and thus it should indeed be re-examined in
order to make it closer to real needs of BiH. Although it has become more than obvious
that  Bosnia  is  a  different  case  from  the  Central  and  Eastern  European  countries’
integration process, the EU has treated the country as any other. No doubt the EU leaders
are often making the same mistake of ignoring the real problems of Bosnian state because
they believe that  mere process  of  European integration will  make the country more
democratic, stable and functional. Thus, the EU officials could make the same mistake
from early 1990s since BiH ethnic leaders would manipulate with their reluctance and
ignorance. As a result, the European officials have remained in a vicious circle between
the “European values” and extremely opposing interests of  the three ethnic elites in
Bosnia. Batt warns that « the EU needs to rebuild its credibility in BiH by forging a unified
position on a long-term strategy for the country, actively engaging in the constitutional
reform process and giving more effective support to the next EUSR »70. Thus, probably the
newly  lunched EU strategy  of  enhanced EUSR headed by  Peter  Sørensen,  will  prove
capacity of the EU in helping Bosnia to resolve its political and social enigma.
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RÉSUMÉS
Since early 1990s there have been a lot of scholarly works in which the European Union member
states  are challenged and criticized regarding a  problem of  their  national  division on global
issues and not speaking “with a single voice” with regards to the EU’s common foreign policy.
Thus, national interests prevent the EU to become more credible, reliable and powerful actor on
global scene. In a similar fashion, in this article I thoroughly explored approach and strategy that
the European Union has applied towards Bosnia and Herzegovina within the framework of all-
embracing  Europeanization  process  of  BiH  from  the  perspective  of  the  EU’s  capacity  and
capability to influence domestic policy-making level. The article ends with the conclusion that
the European Union member states are indeed divided,  ambiguous,  and weak in terms of its
Europeanizing politics in Bosnia and Herzegovina thus further pushing the country into serious
and deep political impasse and social tensions. As a result, such a strategy that the EU has utilised
has proved that to a significant extent the EU itself is responsible for a decade-long status quo in
the country since it is today having a role of international player from which Bosnian ordinary
citizens  have  quite  high  expectations.  Most  importantly,  that  is  about  to  result  in  a  deep
credibility gap for the EU since it could not assert and prove itself as an attractive, reliable, and
powerful actor that is capable of resolving deep and harsh Bosnian paralysis. 
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